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Introducing GPT‑5 for developers

Introducing GPT‑5 for developers | OpenAI Skip to main content Research Products Business Developers Company Foundation (opens in a new window) Log in Try ChatGPT (opens in a new window) Research Products Business Developers Company Foundation (opens in a new window) Try ChatGPT (opens in a new window) Login OpenAI August 7, 2025 Product Introducing GPT‑5 for developers The best model for coding and agentic tasks. Loading… Share Introduction Introduction Coding Frontend engin

We’ve designed and built our first AI chip: Jalapeño. Designed from the ground up by OpenAI and brought to production with @Broadcom, Jalapeño is purpose-built for the LLM workloads powering ChatGPT,

We’ve designed and built our first AI chip: Jalapeño. Designed from the ground up by OpenAI and brought to production with @Broadcom, Jalapeño is purpose-built for the LLM workloads powering ChatGPT, Codex, the API, and future agentic products. Chips are foundational to the AI https://t.co/mHU7DaMMTi

Do Thinking Tokens Help with Safety?

Today's reasoning models use thinking tokens to attain stronger performance on benchmarks than their instruction-tuned counterparts. It is also generally believed that this more "deliberative" mode should improve alignment and safety, by providing the model a safe space to consider whether its planned answer to a request violates its safety principles. We present evidence that this intuition is not always correct. Across frontier open-weight reasoning models spanning GPT-OSS, Qwen, Olmo, and Phi families, we find that the eventual refusal/compliance outcome is already strongly predictable via a trained head on the first token's hidden representation (0.84-0.95 AUROC and sim88% balanced accuracy for predicting refusal/compliance) before any visible thinking. The thinking process turns out to be more akin to prefix completion than to deliberative revision, with the final outcome rarely changing after the first sim20% of thinking, despite giving the appearance of deliberation at the text level (sim74% of text-level deliberations occur when the response distribution is already locked to one refusal/compliance side). We also find that existing inference-time and training-based safety interventions, despite being motivated by the goal of inducing deliberation, largely shift model behavior toward over-refusal while suppressing already-scarce deliberation signals. Our results suggest that safety behavior in current reasoning models is much less deliberative than commonly assumed, and highlight the need for methods that induce real safety deliberation.